#Learn2Ukraine. From Reactive Support to Strategic Deterrence

On 23 February 2026, Kyiv Dialogue and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Kyiv Office hosted the session “Learn2Ukraine – From Reactive Support to Strategic Deterrence” at Cafe Kyiv in Berlin.

Four years into the war, Europe still lacks a coherent strategy for supporting Ukraine, and this gap is now measurably costly. That was the central finding of this panel discussion, which brought together Lesia Orobets, leader of the Sky Shield Initiative and former Ukrainian MP, and Dr. John Karlsrud, Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), moderated by Marcus Welsch, OSINT and data analyst, and author of the Ukraine Air War Monitor.

What Europe can learn from Ukraine

The most important lesson Ukraine offers is not a specific technology or weapons system, but a way of operating: prototype fast, test under real conditions, and be willing to drop solutions that stop working. Where Western procurement cycles run to a decade, Ukrainian innovation operates in weeks. Karlsrud identified the core obstacle on the European side as the interlocking conservatism of defense ministries, legacy industry, and procurement bureaucracies, a drone industry expert called "the triangle of sadness". European defense systems cannot replicate wartime urgency in peacetime conditions. However, it can build procurement structures designed to shorten decision cycles that prioritize adaptability over long-term fixed specifications.

Beyond procurement, Ukraine has demonstrated that civil society can function as a strategic asset, as Lesia Orobets pointed out. Ukrainian NGOs, volunteer networks, and civic organizations have consistently outpaced state institutions in identifying needs, striving for reforms in the defense sector, delivering technical and managerial solutions, as well as executing monitoring of government military spending. These structures remain underdeveloped in Europe and need to be actively built up to increase capacities in security and resilience.

Civil society is also a crucial early warning system for hybrid threats. A precondition for building these structures is public awareness.

„Secret services in many countries, not just Germany, have a tendency not to publish incidents of hybrid warfare. The population doesn't know what is going on in their own backyards.” – Lesia Orobets

Societies that remain poorly informed about the severity of hybrid threats are eroding their own resilience from within.

From reactive support to strategic deterrence

European states have been operating without a defined strategy for the war in Ukraine. This lack of clarity on what "winning" or "losing" the war looks like, what it would cost, or what the downstream consequences are, caused a Western policy that has been reactive and incremental.

John Karlsrud presented NUPI’s scenario analysis, which concludes that a Russian partial win would cost Europe between 1.2 and 1.6 trillion Euros over four years, driven by refugee flows, emergency military buildups, and Russian pressure on the Baltic States and Scandinavia.

The alternative, front-loaded support for Ukraine that invests earlier and more decisively to avoid a prolonged Russian aggression against Europe, would cost only half that.

“Looking four years ahead, our perhaps surprising finding is this: if Russia wins, it will cost Europe roughly twice as much as increasing support for Ukraine today. It's in our own self-interest to front-load these costs now.” – Dr. John Karlsrud

Ukraine’s endurance is directly linked to European security. How Russia exits the war against Ukraine determines its appetite for further aggression. A Russia that perceives it has (partially) won, will treat that as proof of concept for attacking Baltic or Nordic territory, particularly in a scenario where US military attention is divided by a simultaneous aggressive Chinese move on Taiwan.

The coalition of the willing has created useful political space where NATO and EU frameworks remain stuck. Karlsrud pointed to the emerging mutual understanding on security guarantees as real, but insufficient, progress. This included recent propositions by Boris Johnson to deploy non-combat troops inside Ukraine to move from reactive to strategic engagement. However, the panel acknowledged this remains politically contested.

What needs to be done in 2026

Closing the Baltic Sea to Russian shadow fleet oil trade was identified as one of the highest-leverage economic pressure measures available without direct military escalation. EU administrative procedures are well placed for hindering rusty oil tankers crossing European waters.

Alongside this, stricter enforcement of technology export controls, particularly for – also German – CNC machinery traceable to Russian missile production, would reduce Russia’s strike capacity at a fraction of the cost of intercepting the missiles those machines help build. Also, dual-use components reaching Russian missile production hands Russia a military advantage that European governments are simultaneously spending billions to counter.

On military support, the panel called for providing Ukraine with better deep-strike capacities, increasing both the range and payload effectiveness of Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian military infrastructure. Paired with targeted efforts to degrade Russian air defense capacity, this would shift the cost calculus on the front line.

The Sky Shield Initiative, meaning a continuous Western air cover over uncontested Ukrainian territory against cruise missiles, has estimated costs at 2 billion dollars per year. While Europe seems still not ready to support this as a strategic goal, Russia’s attacks caused 64 to 70 billion Euros in losses of Ukrainian critical infrastructure in January 2026 alone. Even partial implementation of the Shield, including faster delivery of interceptors and better pilot training, would help significantly.

Recommendations

Close the Baltic Sea to Russian shadow fleet oil trade.
Enforce technology export controls as a defence measure.
Supply Ukraine with deep-strike capability.
Move toward the Sky Shield Initiative
Inform European publics more systematically about hybrid warfare activity
Reform European procurement and innovation cycles
Cooperate with European civil society and expert organisations

About the panelists

Lesia Orobets is the founder of the Price of Freedom initiative, advocating for strengthening Ukraine's air defence and enhancing collective security. She is a former member of the parliament of Ukraine.

Dr. John Karlsrud is Research Professor and Head of the Research group on peace, conflict and development at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and co-leader of NUPI's Ukraine Centre. John is the author of the report Europe's choice Military and economic scenarios for the War in Ukraine and leads the project Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine Tracker.

Marcus Welsch is a freelance analyst, documentary filmmaker, and publicist. Since 2014, he has specialized in OSINT journalism and data analysis, focusing on the Russian war against Ukraine, military and foreign policy issues, and the German public discourse. Since November 2024, he publishes the Ukraine Air War Monitor in cooperation with Kyiv Dialogue and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Since 2015, he has been running the data and analysis platform Perspectus Analytics.

This panel took place in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Kyiv Office.