Ukraine Air War Monitor Vol. XV

The Ukraine Air War Monitor provides analyses of Russia’s air campaign against Ukraine. The 15th issue analyzes trend reversals in Russia's air war. In the spotlight section, we focus on Ukraine's deep strikes into Russia and the repercussions of the Iran war for European deterrence capability.

The Ukraine Air War Monitor is published by Kyiv Dialogue in cooperation with the OSINT and data analyst Marcus Welsch, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS).

Sign up to our newsletter to receive upcoming issues straight to your inbox.

Content

► Summary
► Situation in March - Analysis and Trends
► Spotlight - I. Ukrainian attacks in Russia
► II. Iran War Context: Air Defense Outlook
► Method
► About the Monitor
► Download

► Executive Summary

In Russia’s air war against civilian life in Ukraine, several trend reversals became apparent in March.

• In March, the Russian army conducted the largest waves of attacks since the beginning of the war, deploying 6,603 aerial weapons. Within 24 hours, on March 23/24, it deployed 982 drones and missiles. The aim of the new tactic is to increase pressure on air defense and the civilian population through intensive and prolonged operations overnight and into the following day.
  
  
• The number of ballistic missiles fell to 42 (February: 118), and the number of cruise missiles used dropped to 98 (137). There is concern that Russia is holding back reserves for larger waves of attacks in the future. The interception rate remained at 35% for ballistic missiles, while it rose to 89% for cruise missiles (February: 80%). The total amount of non-intercepted payload decreased by around one third in March.
  
  
• Anders als im zurückliegenden Herbst und Winter zielen die Angriffe der russischen Armee vermehrt auf die Regionen. Die russische Armee griff im März zahlreiche ukrainische Regionen in Frontnähe und entlang der Schwarzmeerküste an und konzentriert sich nicht mehr nur auf die ukrainische Energieinfrastruktur, sondern auch auf die Wasserversorgung und den Zugverkehr.
  
  
• Die ukrainische Strategie gezielter Angriffe auf russische Infrastruktur der Ölproduktion und des Ölexports sowie auf Radar-, Flugabwehr- und weitere militärische Schlüsselkapazitäten zeigt Wirkung: Sie beeinträchtigt die russische Kriegsindustrie und erweitert die operativen Handlungsspielräume der Ukraine. Besonders Treffer auf Rüstungsfabriken und Flugabwehrsysteme werden die russische Kriegsführung mittelfristig erschweren. Westliche Lieferungen und Investitionen in die Produktion von Marschflugkörpern in der Ukraine würden diesen Prozess beschleunigen.
  
  
• Im Irankrieg wurden mehr als 1.000 US-Patriot-Abwehrraketen verbraucht, die der gesamten westlichen Welt fehlen – mit enormen Folgen für die Ukraine. Eine aktuelle Studie des Washingtoner Think Tanks CSIS empfiehlt ein europäisches Notprogramm zur Produktionssteigerung europäischer Abfangsysteme wie SAMP/T und IRIS-T.
  
  

► Situation in March - Analysis and Trends

On the night of March 23 to 24, the Russian army carried out the largest wave of attacks against Ukraine in this war to date: within 24 hours, 982 drones and missiles of various types were recorded. The previous peak was 823 aerial weapons on September 7, 2025. Further intensive attacks with more than 700 drones occurred during the night of April 1 and the following day.

Both attack waves indicate a new tactic in Russia’s air war against civilian targets in Ukraine: intensive attacks are now carried out not only at night but also during the following day. This is likely intended to increase the strain on civil society and air defense over longer periods, as well as to cause more civilian casualties.

At the same time, intensive attack waves remain constant throughout the month: on approximately four nights, more than 400 drones are deployed in intensive attacks. On the other nights, attacks involving more than 100 drones—as in previous months—are becoming increasingly frequent and have risen steadily from January (21) through February (24) to March (27).

Largest attack waves of the war

In total, the Ukrainian Air Force recorded attacks involving 6,462 Russian long-range drones in March, including 63% Shahed or Gerbera drones. The remainder are decoy drones intended to distract air defense. In addition, there were 141 missiles and cruise missiles, bringing the total number of drones and missiles directed at civilian targets in Ukraine in March to 6,603—the highest figure of the entire war.

The number of ballistic missiles fell sharply to 42 (previous month: 118), and the number of cruise missiles used dropped to 98 (previous month: 137). The interception rate for ballistic missiles remained unchanged (approx. 35%), while for cruise missiles it rose to 89% (previous month: 80%). As a result, the amount of payload reaching its target fell by around one third in March

The use of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles has fluctuated significantly from month to month in this war. It remains unclear whether the current decline is due to problems in logistics chains and missile production in Russia or whether missiles are being deliberately held back for more intensive use in subsequent months, as was already observed in January 2026 (↗ vgl. Monitor Vol. XIV).

Drone interception rate rises to 90%, hits halved

The interception rate in drone defense continued to rise in March. Over the past year, interception rates had fallen to between 80 and 87% during the sharply increasing drone attacks. Now this key indicator has risen again to 90%—an important trend reversal. The previous peak was 97% in February 2025.

The two major drone attack waves in March demonstrated that the interception rate does not decline when Russia drastically increases the number of deployed drones—on the contrary: during the additional daytime attack waves, the interception rate was significantly higher than during nighttime attacks.

At the same time, Russian attacks using long-range drones—although deployed in continuously higher numbers—did not cause greater destruction. Due to improved interception rates, the number of non-intercepted drones declined from October 2025 (1,077) to 671 in March. If only those drones that actually reached a target are considered, the trend becomes even clearer: Ukrainian Air Force daily reports indicate a decrease in reported strike locations from 979 in October to 515 in March.

Technological advantage through AI

Ukraine has succeeded, both technically and above all industrially, in developing defense systems against attack waves of unprecedented intensity. According to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, Ukrainian companies are now capable of producing 2,000 interceptor missiles and drones per day—with higher investment, this capacity could even be increased further (↗ Presidential Office of Ukraine, 17.3.2026). Ukraine’s lead in drone technology is reportedly acknowledged internally even by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov (↗ ISW, 9.4.2026).
In addition, in mid-March Ukraine established the Defense AI Center “A1” with British support. It is intended to advance the use of artificial intelligence in warfare, for example in data analysis and transmission for autonomous systems or in the control of medium- and long-range strikes. Ukrainian military software Delta also plays a role in this context, as it aggregates data from reconnaissance drones and presents it for operational purposes. For the first time, Ukraine is providing its partners with real combat data to train AI models for unmanned systems (↗ Mychajlo Fedorow, 17.3.2026).

Broadly distributed attacks are intended to wear down the population

Unlike in the previous autumn and winter, the attacks by the Russian army are now once again more widely distributed. In March, far more Ukrainian regions were affected than in previous months. In the daily damage reports, affected regions were mentioned a total of 160 times in March—the highest figure since October 2025.
The pattern becomes clearer when examining the distribution of non-intercepted drones and missiles across affected regions: during the winter, Russia concentrated its attacks on a limited number of targets to disable key nodes of the energy infrastructure. By now, Russia is once again directing its attacks more strongly at multiple regions (oblasts).

Regions close to the front line were particularly affected. For Kharkiv, 26 days with reported damage were recorded in March—the highest monthly figure since the beginning of the war; followed by Odesa (21 days) and Chernihiv (19). By comparison, the Kyiv region was affected on only eight days in March. With a broader distribution of regional attack targets, the risk also increases that interception rates may deteriorate again.

The port city of Odesa also remains a continued focus of Russian air attacks (↗ Monitor Vol. XIII). This is once again demonstrated by the intensified attacks on Ukrainian Black Sea ports. While there were around 150 attacks in total in 2025, there have already been more than 180 in just the first three months of this year (↗ Ukrinform, 23.3.2026). Russian warfare is therefore targeting not only strategically important infrastructure nodes and production sites, but also Ukraine’s export capabilities.

In the reconstruction of thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, and hydropower plants damaged during the heating season, a capacity of more than 4 GW of the destroyed 9 GW has already been restored (↗ DiXi Group, 8.4.2026). However, Russian attacks no longer appear to focus solely on the collapse of energy generation, but are targeting a variety of objectives. In March, President Zelenskyy warned that Russia intends to destroy Ukraine’s water supply (↗ RBC, 25.3.2026).

The Kremlin is also likely seeking to intensify the sense of threat among the Ukrainian population by expanding air attacks. In doing so, the Russian army does not spare particularly vulnerable sites, as demonstrated by the attack on a maternity hospital in Odesa on the night of March 28 (↗ Kyiv Independent, 28.3.2026).

Russian losses at the front

One reason for this could be the changed military situation at the front. In the winter of 2025/26 and the spring of 2026, the Ukrainian armed forces achieved their most significant territorial gains since the incursion into the Kursk region in August 2024 and liberated the largest area in Ukraine since the 2023 counteroffensive (↗ ISW, 9.4.2026). The Russian army in March lost more territory than it was able to capture in some front sections for the first time in a long period—among other factors due to disrupted access to the Starlink satellite network (↗ Monitor Vol. XIV). Russia repeatedly attempts, through false claims of territorial gains, to create the impression that Ukraine is on the verge of decisive losses—this occurs particularly in view of the negotiation process led by the United States, in which Kyiv is to be forced into concessions (↗ ISW, 1.4.2026).

Decline in Russian territorial gains from October to March in year-on-year comparison (↗ ISW, 31.3.2026)

Attacks from Belarus

With regard to flight routes, there are concerns that Belarus may increasingly be used as an approach corridor for long-range drones. Russia is reportedly planning to establish new radio control stations in Belarus for attacks with Shahed drones (↗ Guardian, 24.3.2026). Russia has already used these routes in the past to attack railway traffic in the northwestern regions of Ukraine Ukraine (↗ Monitor Vol. XII).

In recent months, Russia has carried out more than 160 attacks on Ukrainian railway and logistics infrastructure, which has since been secured through camouflage and protective nets as well as electronic warfare. In parallel, Ukraine is shifting its strategy away from purely reactive emergency response toward the systematic development of regional and municipal resilience, with railway infrastructure also forming part of long-term protection and preparedness concepts (↗ Suspilne, 23.3.2026). The construction of protected pumping stations is likewise being considered in order to supply large cities from the Dnipro or Dniester rivers (↗ Suspilne, 7.4.2026).

Threats from technological innovations and attacks on civilians

In March, new Shahed drones, which can achieve significantly higher speeds and altitudes due to their jet engines (↗ IISS, 28.1.2026), were used primarily against civilian infrastructure and logistics in the Kupiansk area as well as against a hospital in Shevchenkove (both locations in Kharkiv oblast) (↗ ArmyInform, 29.3.2026). Ukrainian mobile air defense units were attacked in early April near Poltava with Geran-2 drones controlled via a real-time camera (FPV) (↗ Serhiy Beskrestnov, 9.4.2026).

As already reported (↗ Monitor Vol. XIV), the Russian army is intensifying attacks on civilians using FPV drones and glide bombs, which have become known as the “human safari campaign.” Reports suggest that when Russian FPV pilots, in the final phase of flight with low battery charge, do not find military targets, they search for civilian targets. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses these attacks as a strategy of systematic violence against civilians (↗ ISW, 19.3.2026). An additional threat to civilian life near the front remains Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) measures, in which civilian infrastructure is also targeted in order to disrupt the supply routes of the Ukrainian army.

In addition, the Russian military is attempting to simulate new threat scenarios through psychological warfare. During attacks on the Kyiv region, debris from Lancet drones was found, which, due to their limited range of 40 km, are normally used only at the front. These may have been controlled by a Shahed “mother drone” within a mesh network (a communication network in which multiple drones are interconnected and can exchange signals). However, there is also speculation that the Russian military deliberately deployed or dropped the debris of Lancet drones in order to create the perception of a growing threat from extended-range drone types (↗ ISW, 16.3.2026).

► Spotlight. I. Ukrainian attacks in Russia

Since March 23, the Ukrainian army has intensified attacks on infrastructure that Russia uses for oil exports via Baltic Sea ports. This has caused significant damage to oil tankers and loading terminals in Kirishi, Ust-Luga, and Primorsk (↗ ISW, 30.3.2026). The port city of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar region), Feodosia (Crimea), the Nizhny Novgorod region, and two drilling platforms in the Caspian Sea were also targets. The attacks on the Russian oil industry temporarily blocked up to 40% of Russia’s export capacity at the end of (↗ Reuters, 25.03.2026).

Equally effective were Ukrainian strikes on production facilities of the Russian defense industry and its logistics chains. In March, these included warships, ammunition depots, launch platforms, and aircraft in the cities of Kursk and Bryansk, in Ufa (Republic of Bashkortostan, over 1,000 km from Ukraine), in Crimea, and in the Samara region. In particular, the attacks on the important explosives manufacturing plant in the city of Chapaevsk (Samara region, approx. 750 km from Ukraine) will have consequences for Russian weapons production (↗ Militarnyi, 28.3.2026).

To systematically weaken Russian air defense (↗ Monitor Vol. XII), the Ukrainian army is specifically targeting radar installations and air defense systems. The objective is less a rapid breakthrough than the continuous attrition and overload of opposing systems. This, in turn, expands operational space for conducting deep strikes inside the Russian Federation.

Russian air defense is designed as a layered system in which long-range (S-300, S-400), medium-range (Buk), and short-range systems (Tor) cover different sectors. Nevertheless, gaps repeatedly emerge because the system must protect a very large area and is primarily concentrated on strategically important locations. Ukraine is deliberately exploiting these vulnerabilities. The decisive factor is interrupting the so-called sensor-to-shooter chain—i.e., the steps between radar-based target acquisition and the actual interception process—in order to create delays in procedures and undermine the coherence of air defense.

In Western military doctrine, suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) is considered a prerequisite for military success. Lacking the resources of NATO states, Ukraine is increasingly developing indigenous capabilities for deep precision strikes (DPS). These include modified long-range drones, cruise missiles, and increasingly also domestically developed precision munitions (a comparison of Ukraine’s different DPS capabilities is provided in ↗ Monitor Vol. XI).

An analysis by the Ukrainian platform Tochnyi shows that attacks on Russian air defense systems have continuously increased from June 2025 to early March.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian air defense systems, June 2025 – March 2026, ↗ Tochnyi, 23.3.2026

This strategy, on the one hand, slows down the Russian army’s planning and operational capabilities. On the other hand, it forces the Russian military to divert significant resources to the replacement of highly complex air defense systems, which in turn weakens other areas.

If Russia is unable to compensate for the damage to its air defense systems, military operations will become more costly and less effective. In addition, the likelihood of further escalation in Europe decreases in the medium term, as Russia would be less able to launch attacks against additional neighboring states without a functional air defense capability. (↗ Monitor Vol. XII). For this reason, Ukraine should be urgently supported in this area (↗ Monitor Vol. XI).

Ukraine and its partners could promote and finance the development of systems for medium-range strikes. Such systems cost an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 US dollars per unit and are therefore militarily cost-effective. By comparison, the Russian short-range air defense system Tor costs around 25 to 30 million US dollars, while the medium-range Buk system costs approximately 25 to 45 million US dollars per unit, depending on the variant (↗ Kyiv Independent, 31.3.2026).

Attacks on Russian radar installations and their production centers are particularly effective. Increasing gaps in radar coverage result in more successful attacks, creating a ‘snowball effect’ that we may already be observing in the conflict, as the authors of Tochnyi note.

The effectiveness of this strategy is illustrated by an attack on March 10, when the Ukrainian army struck the Kremny El microelectronics plant in Bryansk, Russia (approx. 100 km from the Ukrainian border) with Storm Shadow cruise missiles. At least five missiles hit a central production facility. Kremniy El is one of Russia’s most important manufacturers of military microelectronics, particularly for missile guidance and control systems.

Ukraine has concluded that the protection of its cities and critical infrastructure cannot rely solely on globally scarce air defense assets. Degrading Russian strike capabilities is therefore assessed to be more cost-efficient and effective than exclusively intercepting incoming aerial threats (↗ Tochnyi, 23.3.2026).

► II. Iran War Context: Air Defense Outlook

The debate surrounding the statements made by Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger shows that innovation is always associated with complex high technology, large budgets, and industrial scaling. However, the war in Ukraine makes it clear that successful innovation is increasingly measured by real-world effectiveness and operational capability, rather than by system perfection. Decentralization, speed, and adaptability are moving to the center of a country’s defense capability (↗ ZDF, 31.3.2026). For the defense of its cities and infrastructure, Ukraine needs low-cost drone defense technology that it can produce itself and continuously adapt.

Nevertheless, proven gun-based systems such as the Gepard anti-aircraft tank, as well as conventional interceptor aircraft and helicopters, remain central components of air defense. For a long time, there was a capability gap in countering high-altitude next-generation Shahed drones (↗ Monitor Vol. VII). Sweden is now planning to provide Ukraine with Tridon Mk2 air defense systems—truck-mounted 40 mm anti-aircraft guns capable of engaging drones and cruise missiles at ranges of up to 12 km (↗ MoD Ukraine, 6.4.2026).

Iran war weakens Europe’s deterrence capability

Western high technology continues to be urgently needed in Ukraine in order not to be left defenseless against particularly destructive ballistic hypersonic missiles and cruise missiles. Russia is currently producing significantly more ballistic missiles than the entire West produces interceptor missiles, particularly PAC-3 types for the Patriot system. This creates a critical gap in European air defense (↗ Monitor Vol. VIII).

In the first days of the Iran war alone in early March, the United States and its allies are estimated to have fired around 800 Patriot missiles to defend against Iranian attack drones and ballistic missiles. By comparison, Ukraine has received around 600 of these interceptor missiles over the entire four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion (↗ New York Times, 9.3.2026).

Other estimates suggest that more than 1,000 air defense missiles were used in the first two weeks of the Iran war alone for the Patriot system—excluding Tomahawk-, THAAD-, and SM-3-type missiles. These stocks are not only lacking for Ukraine. In Asia in particular, the Iran war has placed US allies in a new threat environment after air defense systems were withdrawn from South Korea. This also opens new room for maneuver for China in its policy toward Taiwan (↗ New York Times, 13.3.2026).

The warning about the consequences of the Iran war, in which the asymmetric attrition dynamics were not taken into account, also includes the overall military deterrence capability of the United States. Compared to Russia or China, the Western alliance is increasingly weaker if stockpiles continue to be depleted (↗ The Atlantic, 4.3.2026). While South Korea and Japan are already trying to compensate for the loss of US support, Europe until recently continued to rely on further weapons deliveries from the United States (↗ Korea Tech Desk, 2.2.2026; ↗ New York Times, 13.3.2026).

A European emergency program for air defense

The Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) therefore calls in a recent analysis: “Europe Needs an ASAP Program for Air Defense” (↗ CSIS, 23.3.2026). This refers to the EU funding instrument ASAP for ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production), which was used in 2023 to support Ukraine. Europe must now urgently create a similar emergency program for air defense. This concerns the development and production of corresponding technology, especially the scaling of existing functioning interceptor systems against ballistic missiles such as the French-Italian SAMP/T system or the German IRIS-T system.

Air defense systems in the European Sky Shield Initiative; Infographic: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) (↗ SWP-Aktuell 2023/A 02)

France will be the first country to deliver the latest version of the SAMP/T air defense system to Ukraine later this year in order to test it under real conditions. The modified SAMP/T NG (next generation) system is in the final phase of development. In addition to France, Denmark and Italy have acquired it, and Ukraine is set to receive eight of the new systems (↗ Militarnyi, 15.3.2026).

The associated modified Aster 30 B1NT missiles have a longer range of up to 150 kilometers and are more highly automated. This enables them to respond more quickly to complex threats (↗ Naval News, 1.8.2025). The central problem remains the scaling of production of these interceptor missiles (↗ Monitor Vol. VIII).

Europe competes for scarce stockpiles

The CSIS study warns that the consequences of the Iran war for Ukraine are devastating: a total of 19 countries worldwide operate Patriot systems—they are all competing for scarce interceptor missiles. Replenishment of depleted US stockpiles will now inevitably take priority over Foreign Military Sales (FMS), particularly those to Europe.

An “ASAP for air defense” to produce air defense munitions by European companies and their British and Norwegian partners would need to go beyond the 2023 ASAP initiative as an EU program. The new initiative should be significantly more extensive, endowed with greater authority, and focused on those guided missiles that will continue to be available only in insufficient quantities.

According to the authors of the study, the EU should immediately provide five to ten billion euros for the production of European interceptor missiles, using multi-year contracts to ensure planning security. This would allow it to coordinate deliveries to Ukraine while simultaneously building a strategic reserve for itself and Ukraine.

The program should set ambitious production targets, such as increasing output of Aster 30 missiles from around 220 currently to more than 500 per year by 2028, and IRIS-T to more than 1,000 per year. To achieve this, approval procedures would need to be accelerated, export controls simplified, and a solution found for rising energy costs. Given an estimated need for 600,000 additional employees in the defense industry by 2030, part of the funds would also need to be invested in workforce expansion. The expansion of production capacities in Ukraine and the development of lower-cost interceptor missiles should also be promoted (↗ CSIS, 23.3.2026).

Strengthening European air defense is also of immediate strategic importance for Germany. In the event of an attack on Europe, not only exposed front regions such as Narva or the Suwałki Gap would be at risk, but also those areas that are crucial for logistics, troop movements, and military resupply—and thus particularly Germany (↗ The Baltic Sentinel, 30.3.2026). In light of declining US support and Trump’s statements regarding NATO, the rapid expansion of German air defense is no longer merely a question of alliance solidarity, but of direct national security.

► Method

The air strike database is regularly cross-referenced with daily reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington (↗ ISW).

The launch records originate from the Ukrainian Air Force reports (↗ KPSZSU), and data on regional targets and damage—if available—is supplemented with civilian and military administration sources.

These figures are further verified using additional OSINT sources and are considered highly reliable.

Data sources for the database

Accurately quantifying air strike damage during an active war is inherently challenging. Providing overly precise information could aid Russian military planning, which is why certain reporting restrictions apply (↗ Expro, 2.1.2025).

Consequently, this analysis focuses on attack patterns and dynamics rather than detailed damage assessments.

With over 43 months of data and around 91,700 documented attacks, robust trends have emerged. Monthly missile counts are approximate values, as irregularities have been noted in Ukraine’s reporting system. Discrepancies with other OSINT sources remain within a 10% margin, often below 3%.

A comparison with the missile and drones assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington over a period of more than two years shows a deviation of only 1.6% (↗ CSIS).

► About the Monitor

The monthly newsletter „Ukraine Air War Monitor – Analyses for the Protection of Ukrainian Cities and Infrastructure“ provides analyses on ongoing Russian air strike campaigns, identifies emerging trends, and enables assessments of Russia’s evolving military strategy and capabilities.

The Ukraine Air War Monitor is tailored for political decision-makers, security and military policy experts, and journalists. Its primary objective is to provide data-driven recommendations on how Western partners can enhance Ukraine’s air defence against Russian attacks.

The analysis is based on a comprehensive and unique database tracking every Russian air strike on civilian targets in Ukraine since autumn 2022.

The monitor is published by „Kyiv Dialogue“ in collaboration with OSINT and data analyst Marcus Welsch and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

More information about the series and access to former volumes (in German) can be found on our website (↗ kyiv-dialogue.org).

About the author

Marcus Welsch is a freelance analyst, documentary filmmaker, and publicist. Since 2014, he has specialized in OSINT journalism and data analysis, focusing on the Russian war against Ukraine, military and foreign policy issues, and the German public discourse. In cooperation with Kyiv Dialogue, he has conducted research and panel discussions on Western sanctions policy since 2023. Since 2015, he has been running the data and analysis platform ↗ Perspectus Analytics.

About Kyiv Dialogue

Kyiv Dialogue is an independent civil society platform dedicated to fostering dialogue between Ukraine and Germany. Founded in 2005 as an international conference format addressing social and political issues, it has moved to support civil society initiatives aimed at strengthening local democracy in Ukraine since 2014. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the focus has shifted to social resilience, cohesion, and security policy—including military support for Ukraine and Western sanctions policy. Kyiv Dialogue is a program of the ↗ European Exchange gGmbH.

IMPRINT

Publisher:
European Exchange gGmbH
Erkelenzdamm 59, D-10999 Berlin
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e. V.
Klingelhöferstraße 23, 10785 Berlin

Represented by:
Stefanie Schiffer (European Exchange gGmbH)

Thomas Vogel (European Exchange gGmbH)
Dr. Jan-Philipp Wölbern (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)

Editing and Design:
Matthias Meier

The contents of this publication and external links do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the publishers.

Cover photo: Burning oil storage facilities in the Russian port of Ust-Luga following Ukrainian attacks on March 29, 2026 (↗ Vantor/Reuters handout)