Ukraine Air War Monitor Vol. XVII

The Ukraine Air War Monitor provides analyses of Russia’s air campaign against Ukraine. In this issue: – over 100,000 attacks since 2022 – Ukrainian air defence becoming increasingly effective – ballistic missiles remain a long-term threat – background: the Black Sea as a Russian

The Ukraine Air War Monitor is published by Kyiv Dialogue in cooperation with the OSINT and data analyst Marcus Welsch, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS).

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Content

► Summary
► Situation in May - Analysis and Trends
► Spotlight - I. The Black Sea As a Testing Ground for Russian Expansion
► II. War As a Technological Competition
► Method
► About the Monitor
► Download

► Summary

• In May, the Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine with a total of 7,717 long-range drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. At the beginning of the month, our database surpassed the threshold of 100,000 recorded airstrikes against civilian and strategic targets since 2022.
• The intensity of attacks does not indicate that Russia is achieving its strategic objectives. Rather, it reflects a long-term strategy of attrition against the civilian population.
• Interception rates of Ukrainian air defence increased faster than Russia was able to expand its long-range drone deployment. The number of non-intercepted drones is declining; the accuracy of Russian drones is decreasing.
• With 7,503 long-range drones in May, Russia reached its highest monthly figure since the beginning of the war (+14% compared to the previous month). The pattern of approximately four major attack waves per month, with more than 500 drones each, continues.
• Ukrainian drone air defence reached an interception rate of 91.5% in May (previous month: 89.0%) – the best result since February 2025. This is due to improved coordination and the further development of interception drones.
• Russia deployed 120 cruise missiles and 92 ballistic missiles in May. Cruise missiles were intercepted at a rate of 78% (previous month: 89%), ballistic missiles at 26% (previous month: 17%). During large-scale attacks, interception rates remained high. This shows: Russia’s saturation strategy has so far not achieved greater operational success.
• Contrary to statements from German government circles, Russia remains capable of sustaining pressure with ballistic missiles for a longer period. Approximately 60–70 ballistic missiles and 100 cruise missiles are available to Russia each month.
• Pressure on regions such as Kharkiv and Dnipro remained very high in May. Russia is increasingly relying on sustained strain through continuous drone attacks distributed across the day.
• Odesa is increasingly the focus of Russian attacks due to its maritime infrastructure, but these are being intercepted more effectively, which also restricts flight routes along the Romanian and Moldovan borders.
• Despite alleged Chinese export restrictions, Russia continues to source modern CRPA antennas for its long-range drones. Around 90% of sanctioned technology now originates from China.

Renewed Increase in Russian Attacks – Ukraine Improves Interception Rate

In May, Russia deployed 7,717 long-range drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles against Ukraine. The high number of attacks does not indicate that Russia is achieving its strategic objectives – such as the collapse of Ukraine’s energy supply or a sustained weakening of international support. Because Ukraine decentralized and diversified its production sites and command structures early on, Russia is only achieving limited effects in this area as well. Rather, the continued attacks point to a long-term strategy of intimidation and attrition of the civilian population.

This is also supported by repeatedly documented strikes on residential buildings, hospitals, schools, and museums. Multiple so-called double-tap strikes were recorded, in which a second strike follows shortly after the first in order to target rescue workers and survivors. This is also reflected in the attacks during the first days of June. In May, at least 274 people were killed and 1,763 injured, making it the month with the highest number of civilian casualties in Ukraine in any month over the past four years (↗ OHCHR, 12.6.2026)

Stronger attacks, improved air defence

Two opposing trends are currently emerging: Russia is steadily increasing its drone deployment. At the same time, Ukrainian air defence is becoming increasingly effective in countering these attacks and intercepting incoming munitions, particularly due to new drone defence systems that have been deployed more extensively since autumn  (↗ Monitor Vol. XI).

Interception rates have increased faster in recent months than the growth of Russian drone numbers. As a result, the number of non-intercepted drones is declining, and Russian attacks are achieving fewer successful hits, also due to decreasing targeting accuracy.

Overall, the Russian armed forces attacked Ukraine in May with 7,503 long-range drones – the highest monthly figure since the beginning of the air war in 2022. This corresponds to an average of 242 attacks per night and an increase of 14% compared to the previous month. The established pattern of four major attack waves per month with more than 500 drones each (↗ Monitor Vol. XVI) remains in place.

A new development in May was that two consecutive days saw massive attacks, each extending over one night and the following day. The attack wave of 13 May 2026, with 892 drones, was the second-highest since 2022 (peak value: 948 drones on 24 April 2026 within 24 hours).

Graphic 1: Ukraine intercepted 91.5% of all Russian long-range drones in May

As Russian drone attacks do not increase linearly, future developments can only be assessed in the short term. The growth rate in the rolling three-month average currently stands at 13%. Over the past six months, however, intermittent declines in total monthly drone strike volumes have also been observed (↗ Monitor Vol. XIII). A key question for the future is whether Ukrainian strikes on production sites and suppliers in Russia can sustainably weaken drone production capacity.

In addition, 120 cruise missile strikes and 92 ballistic missile strikes were recorded in May. The use of these weapon systems, which have up to ten times the destructive power of drones, fluctuates significantly from month to month. However, the monthly average for January to May 2026 (184 cruise and ballistic missiles per month) has increased significantly compared to the same period last year (109). Rather than stockpiling newly produced cruise and ballistic missiles, as observed in previous years (↗ Monitor Vol. XVI),  Russia currently appears to be prioritising immediate deployment, thereby intensifying the air war in real time.

In addition to missile use, May saw one IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) strike using the Oreshnik missile. This further development of the RS-26 (Rubezh) missile system had previously been used against Ukraine in November 2024 and January 2026 (↗ Monitor Vol. XIII). The assessment of the strike indicates a slightly modified targeting of multiple warheads. It is possible that Russian forces used the Oreshnik strike to test and further develop their nuclear delivery systems (↗ ISW, 24.5.2026). The strike on the night of 24 May hit Bila Tserkva south of Kyiv, but involved exclusively non-explosive kinetic payloads, causing limited damage (↗ Kyiv Independent, 27.5.2026). Whether a second Oreshnik missile was launched and subsequently crashed in Russian-occupied territory remains unclear to date (↗ ISW, 25.5.2026).

The accuracy of Russian attacks is declining

The most important trend is the significantly increased interception rate of Ukrainian air defence, reaching a monthly average of 91.5% (previous month: 89%). This is the best result since February 2025 and is likely due to improved coordination and analysis within air defence operations, as well as the increased deployment of newly developed interceptor drones (↗ Monitor Vol. XI). Despite growing Russian drone numbers, the higher interception rate has led to fewer successful strikes. The number of non-intercepted drones fell to 634 in May (previous month: 722). This trend has already been visible since last autumn. Back in October 2025 – a particularly critical period for Ukrainian air defence – 1,077 drones were not intercepted. Since then, Russia has continued to increase its drone attacks, but the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defence has increased even more rapidly.

The growing importance of Ukrainian interceptor drones is reflected, among other things, in the procurement of 8,000 Octopus-100 interceptor drones, which are designed to operate effectively even under electronic warfare conditions and further increase the shoot-down rate of hostile drones (↗ UNN, 2.6.2026). According to reports, the success of such systems may lead Russia to increasingly deploy Shahed drones against frontline targets; a Kremlin-affiliated military blogger attributes this shift to the declining success rate of Russian long-range strikes and their lack of strategic focus (↗ ISW, 5.5.2026).

In addition, Russian drone targeting accuracy continues to decline. The number of successfully struck locations fell to 458 in May (previous month: 595; October 2025: 979). The share of Russian drones that are not intercepted but still miss their target continues to rise. In May, this rate stood at 25% (previous month: 17%); in autumn 2025, the error rate was still only 2%. The more drones Russia deploys, the lower their targeting accuracy appears to be.

Graphic 2: The more drones Russia deploys, the lower their targeting accuracy.

Maintaining a continuous increase in the interception rate, therefore, remains decisive. Even an improvement of one percentage point at the current level of attacks would mean that around 75 additional drones could be intercepted within a single month, preventing a corresponding number of strikes on civilian objects.

Private companies support the air force

Ukraine is increasingly integrating private companies into its air defence efforts and offering them the opportunity to establish their own air defence units. According to Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, 27 companies are participating in a pilot programme for drone defence. In the regions around Kharkiv and Odesa, privately organised air defence groups against drones are already operational in close coordination with the regular air force. An increasing number of companies, Fedorov stated, are offering their support to the army (↗ Suspilne, 21.5.2026).

Regional and local authorities have also been instructed to provide financial support to air defence units in their areas, for example by supplying interceptor drones, electronic warfare systems, radar equipment, and automated gun turrets. The declared objective of the Ministry of Defence is to achieve an interception rate of 95%. By autumn, new cost-effective defence systems against Shahed drones and sufficient ammunition are expected to be available.

Missile defence during large-scale attacks

The interception rate of cruise missiles also remained at a high level in May at 78% (previous month: 89%), while the rate for ballistic missiles increased to 26% (previous month: 17%). During the large-scale attack on 2 June, in which 73 missiles were launched, the interception rate for ballistic Iskander-M missiles was 33%, and for the most frequently used cruise missile type, the Kh-101, 96%. Drone defence also reached a rate of 92% that night. Russia’s saturation strategy – the massive deployment of a very high number of strike weapons – has therefore so far achieved no greater success than smaller, regionally distributed attacks.

Pressure on Ukraine’s regions remains high. Kharkiv and Dnipro oblasts continue to top the list of the most affected areas. The regions of Chernihiv and Odesa appeared significantly less frequently in damage reports in May, which in the case of Odesa is also likely linked to improved air defence. The Kyiv region is primarily targeted during major attack waves but ranks more in the mid-range of affected areas in terms of overall burden, measured by the number of nights with registered damage reports.

After a brief decline in April, the Kharkiv region was again subjected to more intensive attacks this month. These appear to have been aimed in particular at terrorising the civilian population. Earlier attack waves were mostly directed at one or two military or logistical targets; current strikes are primarily hitting civilian infrastructure such as the railway system, according to Oleh Syniehubov, head of the regional military administration. The Russian armed forces are also reportedly attempting to maintain air raid alerts around the clock by launching only one or two drones at a time, day and night, but continuing this pattern without interruption for 24 hours (↗ Suspilne, 5.6.2026).

Graphic 3: Significantly fewer days with reported damage in Chernihiv and Odesa in May.

The intensive use of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles remains a problem that should not be underestimated with regard to the coming autumn and winter. Their warheads (400–500 kg) cause significantly more destruction than drones. The volume of non-intercepted explosive payload increased in May from 44 to 60 tonnes solely due to the expanded use of these heavy weapons.

Assessments of Russia’s threat potential

There is a risk that current assessments of Russia’s arsenal of long-range precision weapons may lead to misjudgments. German government representatives have suggested that Russia does not possess sufficient ballistic missiles to sustain the current intensity of attacks “against Ukrainian targets for an extended period” (↗ FAZ, 3.6.2026).

However, the Monitor’s data analysis has so far provided no empirical indication of a significant decline in Russia’s ballistic missile deployment potential. Model calculations from Ukraine reach a similar conclusion: statistically, there is as yet no evidence that fewer Iskander missiles are being used (↗ Militarnyi, 14.5.2026).

On the contrary, much suggests that Russia will once again intensify attacks on energy supply infrastructure and other critical targets this year – particularly in autumn and winter. In May, energy experts explicitly warned that Russia would continue its attacks on energy infrastructure while key measures to secure Ukraine’s heat and electricity supply remain incomplete. The capital and its three major combined heat and power plants are expected to face considerable pressure during the winter. Decentralized cogeneration units, which could serve as backup capacity in the event of attacks, are still in the planning (↗ Kyiv Independent, 8.5.2026). Without improved coordination between the city of Kyiv and the Ukrainian government, assessments warn of renewed large-scale power and heating outages in Kyiv in winter 2026/27.

The threat situation in 2026 is further exacerbated by globally limited air defence stocks. During the war between the United States and Iran, a large share of the world’s available interceptor missiles against ballistic threats was expended (↗ Monitor Vol. XVI). Declining Ukrainian stocks of Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles are likely to be exploited by Russia through increased use of difficult-to-intercept precision weapons.

Estimates of Russian stockpiles vary (↗ Monitor Vol. VIII), and intelligence services regularly revise their figures. The most recent information suggests a total of approximately 2,300 Russian missiles with a range exceeding 350 km – excluding additional converted air defence missiles with shorter range (↗ NV.ua, 6 May 2026).

Experts such as Florian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies assume that Russia uses most of its newly produced missiles directly for strikes (↗ Missile Matters, 31.5.2026). Measured against actual consumption, Russia maintained a high level of weapons production in 2025: around 2,000 missiles were manufactured, including approximately 700 ballistic missiles (including shorter-range systems such as the S-300) and around 1,300 cruise missiles.

Unlike most publicly accessible databases, the Air War Monitor database compensates for gaps and inaccurate reporting through scaled models and evaluates each individual entry. In contrast to other OSINT projects, missile strikes are thus included in the statistics even where unclear type designations would otherwise lead to their omission.

Attacks using ballistic missiles have increased significantly in recent months. The monthly average rose from just under 60 missiles in 2025 to 75 (January–May 2026). Even without accounting for shorter-range systems such as the S-300, Russia's monthly missile output comprises approximately 60–70 Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles, as well as around 100 cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 350 km.

► Spotlight – I. The Black Sea as Testing Ground for Russian Expansion

Odesa is increasingly coming under Russian attack due to the strategic importance of its maritime infrastructure. (↗ Monitor Vol. XII). The Black Sea ports are vital to Ukraine’s foreign trade—not only for agricultural exports, but also for metals and steel products, machinery, chemicals, and general industrial cargo. As electricity supply in Odesa Oblast depends on a limited number of central transmission lines, strikes against these grid nodes can severely disrupt port logistics and, in turn, significantly impair Ukraine’s overall export chain.

The Black Sea Security Forum in Odesa (29–31 May 2026) addressed key security challenges in the wider Black Sea region, with a particular focus on maritime security. Odesa demonstrates Ukraine’s resilience. Despite sustained aerial attacks, Ukraine has exported more than 100 million tons of grain since 2022. In addition to strengthened air defenses, this is attributable to the decisive weakening of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in 2022. Black Sea expert Wilfried Jilge stresses that restoring unrestricted freedom of navigation in the Black Sea will remain a Herculean task for Ukraine and its European partners as long as Crimea remains under Russian control (↗ Jilge: Russia’s expansion southward, 19.3.2026).

A panel discussion organized by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Odesa examined the Black Sea’s role as a strategic testing ground for future conflicts—both for Russia and for NATO states without a direct Black Sea coastline. Marek Kohv (International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn) and Wilfried Jilge (German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin) underscored the relevance of Ukrainian battlefield experience and Russian adaptation strategies for potential contingencies in the Baltic region. Kaliningrad would play a key role in any future Russian aggression against the Baltic states. Nico Lange (Institute for Risk Assessment and International Security, Germany) argued that Western states remain largely reactive to Russian actions rather than exerting strategic pressure of their own—for example by targeting Russia’s maritime infrastructure and port cities.

Keith Kellogg, former U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine, speaking via video link to the Odesa forum, urged Ukraine to continue fighting and to resist a disadvantageous peace settlement. Wilfried Jilge warned that Russia is expanding additional military potential through maritime rearmament in the Sea of Azov and beyond Crimea, generating increased threat vectors against both Ukraine and NATO (↗ DLF, 1.6.2026).

Strike on Romanian Border Town

While the Black Sea Security Forum was underway in Odesa, a Russian Geran-2 drone struck a residential building in the Romanian town of Galați near the Ukrainian border on 29 May. For the first time, two civilians in a NATO member state were injured by Russian weapons. The incident underscores the growing importance of integrated air defense in international maritime and border regions.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, at least 50 Russian drone attacks have been recorded in the Romanian-Ukrainian border area; in roughly 30 cases, drone debris fell on Romanian territory. Given that Romania’s air defense operates under strict constraints to avoid violating neighboring airspace, NATO may be compelled to deepen cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova in countering Russian drone attacks (↗ ISW, 29 May 2026).

Countering Drones over Open Sea

According to Ukrainian interlocutors, defenses against Russian attack waves over the Black Sea have recently become significantly more effective. This improvement is attributed to refined operational concepts, the continuous testing of new drone interception systems, and adjustments in operational command structures. As a result, port infrastructure can be better protected, and approach routes along Moldovan and Romanian airspace—used more intensively by Russia in 2025 for strikes against western Ukraine—can be secured more effectively. Attacks along these vectors are now frequently intercepted over the Black Sea.

Newly developed interceptor drones, however, impose significant navigational demands. Depending on altitude and weather conditions—particularly in fog—orientation over open water is considerably more challenging due to the absence of distinct terrain features. This is especially true for interceptions conducted far from the coastline and during high-intensity attack waves (up to 50 drones within 30 seconds are not uncommon). Long-range radar systems could provide operational advantages. Integrating constantly evolving interceptor technologies into existing air defense architectures remains an additional challenge.

A further innovation involves relocating drone pilots and control functions further inland. In Ukraine, this shift is occurring not only in aerial operations but also in ground-based robotics (↗ FAZ, 20.5.2026). High-capacity data links increasingly allow drone operators to be deployed well behind the coastline or front line without themselves becoming targets of hostile drones. This, however, requires continued expansion of communications and logistical infrastructure.

► II. War as Technological Competition

The war in Ukraine remains above all a race defined by the speed of innovation, adaptability, and low-cost industrial capacity. Military success is increasingly determined by how quickly new technological solutions are developed, integrated into existing structures, and deployed operationally. While Ukraine is managing in 2026 to translate its technological edge in innovative drone systems into operational success and local territorial gains (↗ Monitor Vol. XIV), Russia is currently attempting to obscure the actual situation at the front through an overstated portrayal of its territorial advances (↗ ISW, 1.6.2026). In particular, Ukrainian medium-range strikes are significantly disrupting Russian military logistics. This is evident in recent weeks in front-line supply routes and key corridors to Crimea and is likely to have further negative effects on Russian offensive operations  (↗ ISW, 9.6.2026). The next Monitor issue will provide a detailed assessment of this development.

Nevertheless, Russia’s technical adaptation capabilities remain a security challenge far beyond the battlefield (↗ Monitor Vol. XVI). This is evident both in the continued development of Geran drones and in the modernisation of the Kh-101 cruise missile, which is also capable of reaching large parts of Western Europe and whose warheads now contain cluster munitions with incendiary zirconium elements (↗ ISW, 11.5.2026). Russia has modified its Iskander-M ballistic missiles to more effectively evade Ukrainian air defence systems and is increasingly supplementing production with components from the North Korean KN-23 boosting manufacturing capacity (↗ Militarnyi, 13.6.2026). The Iskander-M missiles now feature improved decoys and dipole reflectors that more accurately mimic the missile’s signature, helping to deceive air defences. In addition, more powerful processors enable more precise image processing and target identification (↗ Suspilne, 13.6.2026).

9M723 Iskander ballistic missile. Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense

The modified Russian drones use CRPA antennas, integrated 4G modems, and foreign SIM cards, allowing them to adjust their flight paths in real time via mobile networks. Russia is increasingly using the Shahed-136 platform not only as a strike drone, but also for reconnaissance, video transmission, and the collection of data on Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. In addition, the jet-powered Geran-5 that flies at higher speeds further challenges Ukrainian air defence systems (↗ DNDIVSOVT, 13 June 2026).

A joint investigation by The Insider and the OSINT research platform Nordsint reveals that Russia continues to obtain access to modern CRPA antennas despite Chinese export restrictions. These antennas suppress electronic warfare jamming signals and thus improve the navigational capability of long-range drones. The report shows how Russia continues to exploit international supply chains through sanctions loopholes for military innovation, with Chinese companies supplying key electronic components for Russia’s air war against Ukraine (↗ The Insider/Nordsint, 8.5.2026). According to Bloomberg, Russia sources around 90% of sanctioned technology from China (previous year: 80%) – a sign of Moscow’s growing dependence on Beijing (↗ Bloomberg, 30.4.2026).

The ongoing development of Russian weapons systems makes clear that this war must increasingly be understood as a technological race beyond attritional warfare. For Europe, this implies the need to significantly accelerate innovation, procurement, and adaptation cycles. The ability to rapidly translate new technologies into deployable military capabilities is likely to become a decisive factor in Europe’s future deterrence and defence capacity. Cost-benefit considerations will also gain increasing importance, which in turn strategically elevates Ukraine as a partner with rapid arms production and high adaptability.

Initial political and industrial initiatives already point in this direction. Following an E3-format meeting, President Zelensky announced that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will support Ukraine in building capabilities for ballistic missile defence. The FREYJA project by the Ukrainian company Fire Point pursues a pan-European approach (↗ UNN, 9.6.2026). According to the company, the FP-7.x interceptor missile was tested for the first time in early June; operational readiness is expected no earlier than 2027, according to the Financial Times. The design foresees the integration of an infrared seeker for terminal guidance by Diehl Defence. Radar systems for target acquisition as well as command-and-control infrastructure are also to be provided by European partners. Technically, the FP-7.x is similar to the Patriot system in being designed for engagement at altitudes of around 25 km and at high speeds. Unlike the US system, however, the FP-7.x uses a combination of radar-based guidance and infrared terminal homing (“heat seeker”), which according to developers and analysts is more cost-effective but potentially more vulnerable to countermeasures.

Test flight of a Ukrainian FP-7.X interceptor missile, which is being developed to counter ballistic missiles. Photo: Fire Point (↗ Iryna Terekh, 3.6.2026)

Experts also point out that the main challenge of modern missile defence lies less in individual components than in their integration, testing, and industrial scaling. Tom Karako (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS) therefore assesses FREYJA more as a complement to existing air defence systems than as a replacement for Patriot (↗ FT, 9.6.2026). Fabian Hoffmann similarly argues that the decisive innovation factor lies less in individual weapon systems than in the ability to organise development, production, and operational feedback loops significantly faster. The history of the Patriot system also illustrates this.

However, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of advancing innovation under wartime conditions significantly faster than often expected (↗ Missiles Matter, 5.6.2026).

► Method

The air strike database is regularly cross-referenced with daily reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington (↗ ISW).

The launch records originate from the Ukrainian Air Force reports (↗ KPSZSU), and data on regional targets and damage—if available—is supplemented with civilian and military administration sources.

These figures are further verified using additional OSINT sources and are considered highly reliable.

Data sources for the database

Accurately quantifying air strike damage during an active war is inherently challenging. Providing overly precise information could aid Russian military planning, which is why certain reporting restrictions apply (↗ Expro, 2.1.2025).

Consequently, this analysis focuses on attack patterns and dynamics rather than detailed damage assessments.

With over 45 months of data and around 106,200 documented attacks, robust trends have emerged. Monthly missile counts are approximate values, as irregularities have been noted in Ukraine’s reporting system. Discrepancies with other OSINT sources remain within a 10% margin, often below 3%.

A comparison with the missile and drones assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington over a period of more than two years shows a deviation of only 1.6% (↗ CSIS).

► About the Monitor

The monthly newsletter „Ukraine Air War Monitor – Analyses for the Protection of Ukrainian Cities and Infrastructure“ provides analyses on ongoing Russian air strike campaigns, identifies emerging trends, and enables assessments of Russia’s evolving military strategy and capabilities.

The Ukraine Air War Monitor is tailored for political decision-makers, security and military policy experts, and journalists. Its primary objective is to provide data-driven recommendations on how Western partners can enhance Ukraine’s air defence against Russian attacks.

The analysis is based on a comprehensive and unique database tracking every Russian air strike on civilian targets in Ukraine since autumn 2022.

The monitor is published by „Kyiv Dialogue“ in collaboration with OSINT and data analyst Marcus Welsch and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

More information about the series and access to former volumes (in German) can be found on our website (↗ kyiv-dialogue.org).

About the author

Marcus Welsch is a freelance analyst, documentary filmmaker, and publicist. Since 2014, he has specialized in OSINT journalism and data analysis, focusing on the Russian war against Ukraine, military and foreign policy issues, and the German public discourse. In cooperation with Kyiv Dialogue, he has conducted research and panel discussions on Western sanctions policy since 2023. Since 2015, he has been running the data and analysis platform ↗ Perspectus Analytics.

About Kyiv Dialogue

Kyiv Dialogue is an independent civil society platform dedicated to fostering dialogue between Ukraine and Germany. Founded in 2005 as an international conference format addressing social and political issues, it has moved to support civil society initiatives aimed at strengthening local democracy in Ukraine since 2014. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the focus has shifted to social resilience, cohesion, and security policy—including military support for Ukraine and Western sanctions policy. Kyiv Dialogue is a program of the ↗ European Exchange gGmbH.

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Publisher:
European Exchange gGmbH
Erkelenzdamm 59, D-10999 Berlin
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung e. V.
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Represented by:
Stefanie Schiffer (European Exchange gGmbH)

Thomas Vogel (European Exchange gGmbH)
Dr. Jan-Philipp Wölbern (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)

Editing and Design:
Matthias Meier

The contents of this publication and external links do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the publishers.

Cover photo: Port of Odesa in peacetime, ↗ Dimastennis, 5.1.2021